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Abstract | In this article, I discuss the controversy surrounding Park Yu-ha’s Comfort 
Women of the Empire in terms of the “politics of memory.” Park offers problematic 
perspectives in Comfort Women of the Empire, denying the Japanese state’s legal 
responsibility regarding its military’s use of “comfort women” in the Asia-Pacific War, 
emphasizing the particularity of Korean comfort women as women from a Japanese 
colony, and viewing wartime sexual slavery as prostitution and sex work. Both Japanese 
and Korean scholars have criticized the book from international legal, historical, and 
feminist perspectives. Since the 1990s, spurred on by the end of the Cold War and the 
rising tide of democratization, historians all over the world have pursued alternative 
forms of bottom-up historiography. In this context, the intellectual genealogy of 
Comfort Women of the Empire can be located at the intersection between post-
structural, postmodern historical epistemology and neo-nationalism. As stipulated in 
the book’s subtitle, “Colonial Rule and Struggles over Memory,” the work also deals with 
the competing memories of various agents regarding the issue of comfort women. The 
manner in which Park arranges, describes, and interprets these memories is a distinctly 
problematic aspect of the book. In this article, by introducing feminist, literary, and 
international political approaches to the issue of comfort women, I criticize Park’s 
representation and narrative pertaining to comfort women.
Keywords | politics of memory, Comfort Women of the Empire, Park Yu-ha, Japanese 
military comfort women issue, neo-nationalist historical discourse, post-structural 
epistemology, international reconciliation
Introduction
Comfort Women of the Empire: Colonial Rule and Struggles over Memory 
(Cheguk ŭi wianbu: singminji chibae wa kiŏk ŭi t’ujaeng), by Professor of 
Japanese literature at Sejong University Park Yu-ha, was published in August 
2013. In June 2014, nine elderly women living together at the “Sharing House” in 
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Kwangju City, Kyŏnggi Province filed a criminal defamation suit and two civil 
suits—one pertaining to a damages claim for psychological pain and the other 
an injunction prohibiting sale of the book—against Park. In February 2015, 
regarding the demand to prohibit the book’s sale, the Seoul Eastern District Civil 
Court ruled that publication would be possible only if thirty-four of fifty-four 
passages designated by the plaintiffs were removed. In January 2016, the court 
also ruled that the plaintiffs each be paid ten million won (ninety million won 
in total). In January 2017, in the first trial pertaining to the criminal defamation 
suit, Park was found not guilty, but the verdict was reversed in an appellate 
court in October 2017 and Park was fined ten million won. She is currently 
appealing this verdict.
In June 2015, in accordance with the court ruling, a second edition of Comfort 
Women of the Empire was published, with thirty-four passages removed. In late 
January 2016, wishing to leave judgment up to readers, Park established a 
website offering free, downloadable versions of the second edition as well as a 
previous work, For Reconciliation (Hwahae rŭl wihaesŏ) (http://parkyuha.org). 
Meanwhile, the controversy took a turn when fifty-four Japanese intellectuals 
(Pae Kŭk-in 2015) and 191 Korean intellectuals (Hŏ Hwan-chu 2015) signed a 
petition, in November and December 2015, respectively, opposing the prosecution 
of Park on the grounds of freedom of expression and conscience. Then, a Korean-
Japanese diplomatic delegation announced a “resolution” to the comfort women 
issue on December 28, 2015. Since 1991, when Kim Hak-sun became the first 
Korean former comfort woman to testify about her experience, the comfort 
women issue in Korea had involved mostly feminists and civil rights associations. 
With the “resolution” in 2015, however, it moved into the national public sphere.
Korean society’s fierce opposition to Comfort Women of the Empire provides 
a stark contrast with the book’s reception in Japan, where it received the 
Mainichi Newspaper’s (Mainichi shinbun’s) Asia Pacific Award (July 2015) and 
the Ishibashi Tanzan Memorial Journalism Award (November 2015). It is 
superficial and deceptive, however, to attribute differing interpretations and 
perceptions in Korea and Japan regarding Comfort Women of the Empire—and, 
more broadly, Japanese colonial rule and war crimes—to an “ethnic divide.” In 
Japan there exists both support for and opposition to Comfort Women of the 
Empire (Yun Hŭi-il 2016), while in Korea, opinion is divided on how to deal 
with the comfort women issue (Cho Chŏng-hun 2016; Kim Hyo-chŏng 2016; Yi 
Wŏn-tŏk 2016). In this sense, any East Asian historical “settlement,” particularly 
pertaining to forced mobilization under imperial Japanese rule and wartime 
sexual crimes, is complicated by the entanglement of official responses at the 
government level, collective and cultural representation at the social level, and 
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memory, testimony, and civic movements at the level of groups and individuals. 
As reflected in Comfort Women of the Empire’s subtitle, Colonial Rule and 
Struggles over Memory, the book also deals with the competing memories of 
various agents—the wartime, postwar, and post-Cold War memories of Japanese 
soldiers, Japanese comfort women, and Korean comfort women—regarding the 
comfort women issue. What is especially problematic about the book is the way 
in which Professor Park arranges, narrates, and interprets these memories. In 
any case—or perhaps precisely because this is the case—like a flare illuminating 
the battlefield in the dead of night, the controversy over this book has served to 
expose the uneven topography of Korean and Japanese discourse regarding the 
comfort women issue, reminding one that the ghosts of the past continue to 
haunt East Asia.
The Comfort Women of the Empire Phenomenon
1. The Content of Comfort Women of the Empire
Comfort Women of the Empire’s controversial arguments are threefold. First, 
Japanese soldiers did not “directly” forcibly mobilize comfort women, and only 
private brokers who used physical force may be held legally accountable. This 
means that Japanese soldiers are merely indirectly and morally responsible for 
tolerating or overlooking dishonest recruitment and illegal management 
practices. Also known as the “broker culpability interpretation,” this perspective 
denounces colonial collaborators who participated in the mobilization of 
Korean comfort women. Even while pointing out that colonial rule itself was the 
root cause of national division, Park argues that if one asks Japan to apologize 
and take responsibility, then one must also ask that Korean pro-Japanese 
collaborators—those who actually carried out the recruitment of Korean comfort 
women—apologize and take responsibility.
Second, Park emphasizes the particular identity of Korean comfort women, 
who originated from a Japanese imperial territory. She divides the Japanese 
military’s sex crimes into three categories—one-time rape, abduction and sexual 
assault, and managed prostitution—placing Korean comfort women in the third 
category (Park Yu-ha 2015a, 110). Comfort women came from Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Netherlands, and according to Park, 
their experiences varied depending on their nationalities. In other words, 
depending on where they were from, comfort women’s experiences fell into one 
of the following categories: (1) “simple prostitution,” which existed in designated 
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brothels in military camps; (2) “comfort” on the battlefield and “rape within the 
comfort system”; and (3) “simple rape” (of women belonging to enemy 
countries; Park Yu-ha 2015a, 264). More specifically, comfort women from 
“enemy country” the Netherlands or “occupied country” Indonesia were 
subjected to rape or abduction and sexual assault. In these cases, Park 
acknowledges Japanese soldiers’ use of forced mobilization. Korean comfort 
women, however, experienced managed prostitution and rape within the 
comfort system. As colonial subjects of the Japanese Empire, Park argues, these 
women were subjected to “national mobilization” rather than “forced 
mobilization.” Thus she views Korean comfort women not as categorical victims 
but contributors to the war effort, who maintained “comrade-like relations” with 
Japanese soldiers.
The relationships between Japanese soldiers and Dutch, Indonesian, and Korean 
women were fundamentally different. To Japanese soldiers, Dutch women were 
“enemy women,” while Indonesian women were “women of an occupied 
territory,” and Korean comfort women were as comrades on a similar level with 
Japanese women. ... The reason why compensation has been complicated in 
Korea and Taiwan, above all, is that these two countries were each Japanese 
colonies in the past. One simply cannot view “Korean comfort women” in terms 
of victim versus aggressor. While they were “victims of empire” as far as they 
were mobilized under colonial rule, their existence was complicated by their role 
as “comrades” who, structurally, ended up cooperating [in the war effort]. (Park 
Yu-ha 2015a, 264-65)1
This passage reveals the book’s problematic understanding of wartime sexual 
crimes, obscuring whether “comfort” on the battlefield and rape within the 
comfort system are actually crimes, and the distinction between prostitution 
and rape. Even accepting Park’s categorization, which asserts the existence of 
“volunteer comfort women” (prostitutes), the fact remains that the recruitment 
and management of comfort women was carried out primarily through 
coercion and fraud. And even if some women voluntarily participated in the 
recruitment process, this does not necessarily preclude their becoming victims 
of rape. Just looking at the memoirs of Japanese soldiers cited in the book, 
unlike Japanese comfort women, Korean comfort women largely appear as 
victims of rape within the comfort system, in contrast to their Japanese 
counterparts. Nonetheless, omitting such ethnic discrimination and sexual 
violence, Park portrays Korean comfort women as comrades, collaborators, and 
patriots of the empire.
1. The underlined parts were removed in the second edition by court order. 
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Third, Park Yu-ha (2015a, 246) stipulates that “Comfort women basically fell 
within the bounds of prostitution.” Understanding comfort stations in the 
context of Japanese traditional licensed prostitution, she views comfort women 
as prostitutes and sex workers. According to this line of argument, comfort 
women and comfort stations were an example of the diverse forms of licensed 
and unlicensed prostitution facilities that existed across Asia at the time, and 
Japanese military comfort stations represented a special form of licensed 
prostitution.
In this narrative, denying forced mobilization by Japanese soldiers and 
forming the logical basis for the broker culpability interpretation, Korean 
comfort women are classified not as victims of wartime sexual violence but sex 
workers who voluntarily participated in prostitution because they were poor. 
The root cause of this situation, moreover, was not the Japanese state’s militarism 
and inhumane wartime acts, but the patriarchal and capitalistic social structure 
inducing poor women into prostitution.
In order to uncover the essence of the “comfort women,” it is first necessary to 
recognize the fact that “Korean comfort women’s” pain was basically little 
different from that of Japanese prostitutes. While it is true that discrimination 
existed, poverty, male-supremacist patriarchy, and statism engendered comfort 
women’s misfortune more than ethnic factors, and thus “Korean comfort women” 
emerged much the same as Japanese comfort women. Behind this was the 
institution of licensed prostitution’s transplantation to Korea with colonization, 
whence private brokers emerged. (Park Yu-ha 2015a, 33-34)2
Explaining comfort women and comfort stations in terms of the Japanese 
tradition of licensed prostitution and the extenuating circumstances of war, Park 
obscures the difference between voluntary prostitution as a sex worker and 
violent, criminal rape. Despite the existence of a clear legal basis for judging the 
difference between prostitution and rape, throughout the book she differentiates 
between them merely in terms of whether remuneration is granted or not (Park 
Yu-ha 2015a, 143-44). Park writes: “‘Comfort women’ were also coerced into 
‘unpaid’ labor in this way. Notably, it was very unlikely they were paid for the 
rape by officers they experienced as a kind of rite of passage upon arriving at 
the camps” (145). She also writes: “‘The labor of Korean comfort women,’ who 
endured rape while in transit and had to service hundreds of men, was an 
unimaginably extreme form of labor” (147). 
2. The underlined parts were removed in the second edition by court order.
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2. Criticism of Comfort Women of the Empire
Criticism across diverse fields including law, history, and feminist studies emerged 
in Korean society immediately following Comfort Women of the Empire’s 
publication (Yi Chae-sŭng 2013, 2015; Yun Hae-tong 2014; Pae Sang-mi 2014; 
Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 2015, 2016b, 2016c; Kim Hŏn-chu, Paek Sŭng-teok, Chŏn 
Yŏng-ok, and Ch’oe U-sŏk 2015; Sin Ŭn-hwa 2015; Sin Tong-kyu 2016; Kang 
Sŏng-hyŏn 2016). These criticisms can be arranged into the following categories.
(1) The Issue of Japanese State Responsibility
First, from a legal standpoint, there is the problem of Japanese state responsibility 
pertaining to institutions for the wartime mobilization of comfort women and 
management of comfort stations. Here, the issue becomes one of who mobilized 
the comfort women and whether they used coercion. Yi Chae-sŭng was the first 
to voice sharp criticism in this regard. As a legal scholar, he focuses on Park’s 
argument that the “Japanese government bears no legal responsibility regarding 
the mobilization of comfort women.”
Differentiating between “structural coercion” and “actual coercion,” Park 
charges the private brokers as those who used physical violence, i.e. actual 
coercion, in mobilizing comfort women. She thus views private brokers as the 
criminally responsible parties in the mobilization of comfort women. Meanwhile, 
she condemns as illegal the violence against women of Japanese wartime enemy 
states such as China, the Netherlands, and nations in Southeast Asia. Yet she 
argues that discriminatory laws and institutional and structural violence—the 
Brokerage Agent Regulatory Provisions (1922) and Korean Brokerage Agent 
Ordinance (1940), which weakened Korean criminal law provisions—carried 
out through the colonial mobilization system were “legal.” In this respect, the 
private brokers practicing actual coercion were merely the executors of 
mobilization.
However, this does not absolve the Japanese war command of responsibility. 
The idea of structural responsibility must serve as a tool for strengthening and 
clearly imputing rather than nullifying and obscuring legal responsibility. 
Furthermore, the Japanese government and military command must bear direct 
legal responsibility as actors. Park denies the direct involvement of the Japanese 
state in the recruitment of comfort women by private brokers. Through the 
Japanese military document “Cases Pertaining to the Management of Military 
Comfort Stations” (1938), she argues that the Japanese government fulfilled its 
basic legal duty in prohibiting the illegal recruitment of comfort women, and 
that it should take responsibility only for the inadequate implementation of this 
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law. However, based on Han Hye-in’s research, Yi Chae-sŭng argues that the 
purpose of this document was not to monitor private brokers’ illegal behavior, as 
Park understands it, but rather to enable the military and government to deeply 
intervene in and legitimize private brokers’ recruitment of comfort women (Han 
Hye-in 2013, 372-73, 395-96).
Yi Chae-sŭng, in particular, criticizes the “duality and duplicity of colonial 
law.” “If one pays attention to the dualistic, discriminatory legal system, Park’s 
perspective regarding collaborators as imperial citizens appears truly unjustified,” 
he writes, returning the comfort women issue from the social to the legal sphere. 
Compared with regulation in Japan, the Government-General of Korea’s regulation 
of the comfort women recruitment system was rather lax. It passed the Brokerage 
Agent Regulatory Provisions (1922), enabling brokers to outmaneuver and evade 
the law, and the Korean Brokerage Agent Ordinance (1940), enabling compre- 
hensive government control over the mobilization of laborers in Korea as part of 
the total-war mobilization system. In marked contrast to the Brokerage Agent 
Law in Japan, which banned brokers in the business of prostitution, Korea’s 
Brokerage Agent Ordinance included provisions specifically allowing for the 
brokering of prostitution (Yi Chae-sŭng 2013; Han Hye-in 2013, 377-81, 395-
96).
According to Yi Chae-sŭng, under Korean laws imported from Japan 
(Prohibition of Human Trafficking through Capture and Abduction, Articles 
226 and 227) and international laws (the International Agreement for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Trade [1904], the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Trade [1910], and the Slavery Prohibition 
Convention [1926]), to which Japan was subject, the comfort women system was 
a case of illegal human trafficking. Even if the Japanese government and the 
Government-General of Korea “legalized” comfort women through a legal 
system discriminating against colonial territories based on a formal legal logic, 
they cannot avoid their culpability in managing sexual slavery, a crime against 
humanity. Yi Chae-sŭng rebukes the denial of legal responsibility and affirms 
ethical and humanitarian responsibility, demanding that Japan make a formal 
apology once the government acknowledges and fulfills its legal responsibility.
(2)  The 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and Responsibility for Colonial 
Rule
Chŏng Yŏng-hwan, a historian residing in Japan, locates Comfort Women of the 
Empire within Japanese comfort women discourse in terms of its historical 
understanding of the properties and limitations of the “1965 system.” He 
criticizes the book’s arguments with the specific aim of pointing out its academic 
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and methodological shortcomings.
Chŏng Yŏng-hwan first focuses on the continuity between Comfort Women 
of the Empire and Park’s earlier work, For Reconciliation: Textbooks, Comfort 
Women, Yasukuni, and Tokdo (Hwahae rŭl wihaesŏ: kyogwasŏ, wianbu, 
Yasŭkuni, Tokto, 2005).3 A recipient of the Asahi Newspaper’s (Asahi shinbun’s) 
Osaragi Jirō Literary Award, For Reconciliation garnered considerable attention 
in Japan. Immediately following publication, it also aroused criticism and 
controversy, which is generally divisible into three categories. First, there is the 
issue of the forced mobilization of comfort women. Referencing Kim Puja 
(2008, as quoted in Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 2015), who has offered the most 
systematic criticism of For Reconciliation, Chŏng Yŏng-hwan criticizes the very 
basis of Park’s historical revisionism, which reframes the comfort women issue 
in terms of a “narrow conception of coercion.” Second, there is the issue of the 
purpose of comfort stations: “naturalizing” soldiers’ sexual desires. Park 
interprets the establishment of comfort stations as inevitable and as serving to 
suppress the rape of ordinary women. In this manner, she portrays comfort 
women as structural “sacrificial lambs” for ordinary women. Third, there is the 
issue of evaluating the Asian Women’s Fund that the Japanese government 
attempted to establish in 1995. Chŏng Yŏng-hwan argues that the fund revealed 
the motivation of a former colonizer to avoid legal responsibility for colonial 
rule. Following Sŏ Kyŏng-sik (2010, as quoted in Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 2015), he 
criticizes Park’s argument that Korean nationalism—in the form of the Korean 
Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereafter 
the Korean Council), which rejected the fund—is the cause of “discord” between 
Korea and Japan. For Chŏng Yŏng-hwan, this is violence disguised as recon- 
ciliation.
Chŏng Yŏng-hwan focuses in particular on Park’s understanding of the 
Korea-Japan Claims Agreement, evident in Comfort Women of the Empire, 
which he sees as historically inaccurate and biased. Contrary to Park’s inter- 
pretation, the “claims providing a final resolution” in the 1965 Korea-Japan 
Normalization Treaty remain controversial. According to a number of studies, 
the agenda between Korea and Japan at the time was the “unpaid wages of 
conscripted laborers” and not comfort women. Furthermore, the central issue of 
the treaty negotiations was not questioning responsibility for colonization or 
postwar compensation, but Korea-Japan economic cooperation for the develop- 
ment of the Korean economy to strengthen the Korea-US-Japan anti-communist 
bloc during the Cold War. Incidentally, a series of new rulings by the Korean 
3. Heibonsha published the Japanese version in 2006.
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judiciary regarding the Korea-Japan Claims Agreement in the early 2010s4 
undermined the 1965 system, which had been a provisional measure established 
under Cold War conditions without any reflection on colonialism.
Linking the basic problems in Comfort Women of the Empire with those in 
the 2005 book For Reconciliation, Chŏng Yŏng-hwan understands Comfort 
Women of the Empire as an attempt to critically intervene and protect the 
threatened 1965 system. In For Reconciliation, Park states that it was irresponsible 
for Korea to deny the 1965 system and demand renegotiation and compensation. 
In Comfort Women of the Empire, while comprehensively criticizing the 
Constitutional Court’s 2011 decision, she argues that it was the Korean govern- 
ment that gave up Korean comfort women’s rights in negotiating a claims agree- 
ment. In Comfort Women of the Empire, regarding the Japanese military comfort 
women system, she denies the Japanese state’s legal responsibility, interpreting 
the facts through the broker culpability interpretation. On this basis she makes 
three arguments: (1) Comfort women have no claim to damages; (2) Even if 
such a claim did exist, the Korean government gave it up while negotiating 
normalization; and (3) The Korean government’s reception of economic 
cooperation served as compensation for Japan’s actions with regard to Korea 
during the Asia-Pacific War.
Chŏng Yŏng-hwan asserts that this logical framework is based on serious 
methodological errors. First, Park erroneously cites Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Aitani 
Kunio, Kim Ch’ang-rok, Chang Pak-chin, and other existing studies, distorting 
this research for her own ends. Second, she uses the concepts of “compensation” 
and “reparations” based on the principle of legal liability to confuse the issue 
when discussing the Asian Women’s Fund and 1965 economic cooperation (it is 
precisely because the Japanese government explicitly denies legal responsibility 
that Sŏ Kyŏng-sik and comfort women activists oppose compensation). Third, 
engaging in conjecture as to the identity (comrade-like relations) of comfort 
women from the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea, as opposed to comfort 
women from occupied territories such as China and Indonesia, through the 
testimonies of Japanese soldiers, she arbitrarily selects and interprets testimonial 
evidence, ignoring its particularity. “This manner of writing ... usurps the 
‘testimonial evidence’,” and reveals a “‘method’ that abandons the tension 
4. On August 30, 2011, stating that the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Agreement provoked an 
interpretive dispute as to whether Japanese military Korean comfort women’s claims had been 
nullified, the Korean Constitutional Court ruled that the Korean government’s inaction to resolve 
this dispute according to Article 3 of the agreement was unconstitutional. On May 24, 2012, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the right to claim damages due to the inhuman and illegal actions of the 
Japanese state was not subject to the “final resolution” clause of the Claims Agreement. 
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between the ethics of historical narration and the subject,” writes Chŏng Yŏng-
hwan (2015, 476).
In spite of such serious methodological errors, why did Japanese intellectuals—
especially self-professed “liberal” intellectual critics (Akira Iriye, Ueno Chizuko, 
Tanaka Akihiko, Wada Haruki, etc.)—evaluate the book so favorably? First 
submitting this question in a 2015 article, Chŏng Yŏng-hwan explores it more 
deeply in his 2016 book.5 According to Chŏng Yŏng-hwan (2016c, 30-32), the 
primary reasons why Japanese society extolled such widespread praise for Park’s 
For Reconciliation and its 2013 successor Comfort Women of the Empire were: (1) 
its criticism of Korean anti-Japanese nationalism; and (2) its positive evaluation 
of “postwar Japan.” Specifically regarding the comfort women issue, this meant 
the book’s criticism of the Korean Council and support for the Asian Women’s 
Fund.
Chŏng Yŏng-hwan traces Park’s view supporting the broker culpability 
interpretation and denying Japanese soldiers’ responsibility to Hata Ikuhiko, 
who argued that comfort stations were no more than “battlefield licensed 
prostitution facilities” (i.e. comfort stations were established according to 
soldiers’ demands but were basically sites of private prostitution). This attempt 
to minimize Japanese soldiers’ responsibility is one example of the diverse 
responsibility-avoidance discourse prevalent in Japanese society since 1991, 
when Kim Hak-sun became the first Korean comfort woman to come out and 
speak of her experiences (Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 2016c, 7, 47-60).
According to Chŏng Yŏng-hwan, Comfort Women of the Empire presents a 
“dual historical revision,” satisfying both the Japanese nationalist conservative/
rightist logic of the “Great Japanese Empire” and the centrist majority and 
media’s overestimation of “postwar Japanese repentance.” Park distorts victims’ 
voices and presents to Japanese society a historical revisionist account of the 
comfort women as “true memory.” Her advocacy of reconciliation, in particular, 
exempts the Japanese government from responsibility and emphasizes the need 
to contain calls by the Korean Council and other victims to assign responsibility. 
However, Chŏng Yŏng-hwan’s position is that without efforts by the “Japanese 
government to reflect, repent, provide legal compensation, uncover the truth, 
and implement measures against recurrence,” there can be no resolution to the 
Japanese military comfort women issue. In this respect, regarding the December 
28, 2015, Claims Agreement between the foreign ministers of Korea and Japan, 
“One cannot but call this an ‘agreement’ to contain and exclude other voices,” 
5. Chŏng Yŏng-hwan (2016c) is a Korean translation of the Japanese edition (Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 
2016a). 
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something “far from a resolution” (Chŏng Yŏng-hwan 2016c, 171-74).
(3) The Patriarchal State System and the Wartime Sex Crime Issue
In The Politics of Memory Surrounding Comfort Women (Wianbu rŭl tullŏssan 
kiŏk ŭi chŏngch’ihak, 2014), Ueno Chizuko points out how the comfort women 
issue emerged as a post-Cold War phenomenon in the 1990s. Several elements 
were important in this regard: constructivist theory in the fields of history and 
sociology (historiography as a discursive struggle in which representation and 
memory are ceaselessly reconstituted); a paradigm shift in understanding Japan’s 
prewar period (discontinuity, continuity, and neo-continuity interpretations); 
and the new orientation of feminism since the 1980s (with its emphasis on 
women’s agency, women’s participation in war not as victims but aggressors, and 
women’s willing wartime cooperation).
As a feminist, Ueno criticizes the patriarchal nationalist paradigm that 
reduces women’s sexuality to a discussion of men’s rights and property. She 
rather investigates women’s conscripted labor and the comfort women issue 
from a perspective transcending the “nationalization” (kokuminka) of women 
and deconstructing the nation state through gender. Regarding comfort women’s 
damages claims, which began with Kim Hak-sun in 1991, Ueno criticizes the 
government’s position that any claims to damages were resolved in the 1965 
Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty as based on patriarchal logic. She further 
asserts that the Japanese military comfort system did not simply exist in the 
past, but remains present as a set of three crimes that “we [Japanese society] 
continue to commit today.” These are: (1) the crime of wartime rape; (2) the 
crime of forgetting these crimes in the postwar era; and (3) the crime of denying 
the accusations of the female victims (Ueno 2014, 25-48, 97-99).
One must acknowledge Ueno’s contribution to revealing the complexity of 
the “divide-and-rule dynamic of the comfort women issue, which, surrounded 
by the nation state and imperialism, colonial rule and racism, patriarchy and 
discrimination against women, and gendered double standards, turns women 
against each other” (Pae Sang-mi 2014, 275). However, some progressive 
Japanese scholars and Korean feminists criticize her transnationalist feminist 
argument. This is because one might plausibly understand her analysis as 
focusing solely on women’s solidarity, to the exclusion of differentiating between 
wartime aggressor and victim states, colony and empire, and nationalities.
In terms of how Park includes discussion not only of Korean but also 
Japanese comfort women in Comfort Women of the Empire, on the surface she 
shares Ueno’s critical perspective on nationalism. Emphasizing that it was 
Korean men who mobilized Korean comfort women, however, she reverts to 
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reducing the issue of gender to nation. Furthermore, she emphasizes that Korean 
comfort women received better treatment and a better “labor environment” 
than comfort women from occupied or enemy countries. However, comfort 
women had to perform sexual services during the war without freedom of 
movement. Furthermore, one should rather critically understand Japanese 
soldiers’ “good treatment” of Korean comfort women, who were in a state of 
confinement, as the patriarchal discipline of the Japanese military and a strategy 
for designating women’s inferior place within this hierarchy. “In order to 
expedite reconciliation between Korea and Japan, a comprehensive critique of 
the social structure enabling war and the comfort women without relation to 
nationalist is necessary,” as Pae Sang-mi writes. But instead, Park “fixates on 
Japanese, Korean, and American nationalities, failing to appreciate the 
fundamental problem and abandon a superficial patriarchal logic degrading 
women” (Pae Sang-mi 2014, 272-74).
The Politics of Memory
Comfort Women of the Empire: Colonial Rule and Struggles over Memory serves 
as the courtroom within which Park presents her postmodern “historical 
retrial,” calling forth Korean comfort women and pro-Japanese collaborators as 
accomplices to Japan’s imperialist war. While constantly emphasizing historicity, 
her book is nonetheless academically inaccurate. While constantly emphasizing 
testimonial evidence and memory, her analysis is arbitrary. While criticizing the 
modern state as a patriarchal war machine, she absolves imperialist racism, 
colonial exploitation, and wartime sex crimes, hastily attempting to settle the 
contradictions and conflict they engendered. While examining the comfort 
women issue in terms of an immense timescale, she does not acknowledge the 
basic values and norms of universal feminist and human rights that have 
developed since 1945. While approaching the past from an extremely legalistic 
perspective, she argues that the law is unimportant in resolving the comfort 
women issue. Criticizing the centrality of power in international politics, the 
American “imperialism” that engendered the Cold War, and progressives in 
both Korea and Japan for promoting international pressure with respect to the 
comfort women issue, she expresses concern about the “politicization” of the 
comfort women movement and suggests inducing the conflicting parties to 
participate in a process of agreement but does not put forward any concrete 
criteria or measures by which such a conflict could be moderated. How might 
one interpret these inconsistencies?
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Comfort Women of the Empire presents East Asian history as a site of 
memory struggle. Park repeatedly argues that official collective memory, framed 
by the category of the nation, is socially constructed through a process of 
politicization (of which she is critical), and beneath this formalization of 
collective memory lie suppressed individual memories.
These women do not abandon their valued memories by choice. This is due to 
the pressure of “society,” which is the “problem.” One might also understand this 
as the subconscious acknowledgement of the potential for such memories to 
produce fissures in the “Korea as victim” narrative. However, was not the 
obliteration and forgetting of those memories that might have allowed these 
women to forget the pain of the comfort stations also a kind of violence against 
them? (Park Yu-ha 2015a, 68)
1. The Entanglement of Post-structural Epistemology and Neo-nationalism
Ueno (2014, 13) writes in the opening to The Politics of Memory Surrounding the 
Comfort Women Issue: “All this began in the 1990s.” With the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the communist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the advent of the post-
Cold War era, the demand for liberalism, democracy, and nationalism expanded 
internationally. Academically, a reflective mood prevailed pertaining to the Cold 
War and the modern state, provoking more basic questions and debate regarding 
the nature of history. In South Korea, democratization progressed in the late 
1980s and the Korean Council formed in the 1990s as the feminist movement 
became more active. Meanwhile, in 1991, Kim Hak-sun became the first Korean 
comfort woman survivor to come forth and speak of her experiences and appeal 
for reparations from Japan. The comfort women movement and related research 
thus entered a new phase.6
Yoshino Nozaki’s (2015) overview of Japan’s comfort women controversy is 
useful for tracing the genealogy of Comfort Women of the Empire. First, prior to 
when victims’ testimonies began to surface in 1991, records pertaining to comfort 
women had emerged only in piecemeal fashion, consisting of men’s individual 
reports, diaries, memoirs, and novels. Senda Kakō’s 1973 book was the first work 
to approach the comfort women issue critically. His account was mostly based 
on the memories of men who had received sexual “service,” and discussed the 
memories of only a few Japanese comfort women. The two Korean comfort 
women Senda interviewed remained silent. The book became a bestseller, and 
his choice of terminology, “army-accompanying comfort women,” became quite 
6. For a historical overview of Korea-Japan comfort women diplomacy, see Yi Hunmi (2017).
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widely used and later greatly controversial.
In 1991, having come across Kim Hak-sun’s testimony, Japanese historian 
Yoshimi Yoshiaki discovered evidence at the Japanese Self Defense Forces 
archive that the Japanese military had directly participated in the organization 
of comfort stations. Yoshimi reported these findings through major newspapers 
in 1992, and Japanese prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa eventually officially 
apologized to Korea. In 1993, fifteen more Korean comfort women testified as to 
their experiences. Late that year, the “Kono statement” emerged, acknowledging 
the direct involvement of the Japanese military in the comfort women system. 
In 1997, nearly all school textbooks in Japan discussed the issue. However, neo-
nationalists soon began to speak out against the Japanese government’s apology 
and recent research on the comfort women issue.
Thereafter the historical controversy pertaining to the comfort women issue 
progressed as follows. First, there is the struggle between neo-nationalist and 
progressive feminist historians. Neo-nationalists insist that comfort women 
victims’ testimony is unverifiable while scrutinizing it for “mistakes.” For example, 
they focus on the fact that “army-accompanying comfort women” was not a 
term used at the time, and on the degree of brokers’ intervention and coercion. 
Despite the fact that progressive feminist scholars have prevailed in the empirical 
and analytical struggle, neo-nationalists disseminate their arguments through 
popular mainstream media. Consequently, many 2002 middle-school textbooks 
removed any mention of comfort women.
Second, there is the epistemological struggle between post-structural feminist 
theorists and progressive feminist historians. Ueno views the post-Cold War 
conflict between neo-nationalists and progressive feminist historians as rooted 
in the empiricist historical perception that acknowledges only written records as 
historical material, criticizing this position from a post-structuralist perspective. 
The core of her critique is that the empiricist historical approach “denies victims’ 
testimonies as evidence and mistrusts the ‘reality’ of victims’ firsthand experience 
or what they heard.” She emphasizes “diverse history” or “pluralistic history” 
representing the differing realities of disparate individuals over selecting a single 
history.
Regarding Ueno’s criticism, progressive feminist historians such as Yoshimi 
question the argument that there are no “facts” or “truth” in history and that 
reality is reconstructed according to perspective. Yoshimi asserts that historical 
facts can be reconstructed through official and unofficial written documents, 
testimony, and many other sources. In particular, she emphasizes that historians 
subject oral history to careful evaluation, integrating diverse forms of evidence.
As epistemological debates continue among feminists, neo-nationalists 
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borrow from postmodernist discourse to narrate Japanese history for the 
purposes of national unity and from a Japanese perspective. Criticizing 
“masochistic historical consciousness,” they deny the forced mobilization of 
comfort women. Their postmodernist line of argument blurs the distinction 
between fact and fiction and is a discursive strategy for producing an idealized 
history of a pure Japan and for rationalizing the war ideology of the prewar 
Japanese empire. They emphasize the fallibility and impossibility of verifying 
testimonial evidence and focus criticism on minute historical details. 
Meanwhile, they argue that historical facts do not arise from empirical research 
and testimonial evidence but “narratives” selected from among diverse 
narratives with varying epistemological merits.7
2. The Diversity of Memory and Postcolonial Historiography
In Comfort Women of the Empire, Park questions the credibility of surviving 
Korean comfort women’s testimonies, viewing them as having been politicized 
by the Korean Council. Furthermore, through the voices of Japanese soldiers 
and Japanese comfort women in Senda’s book and various novels, she reframes 
the memories of Korean comfort women who were silenced. In this respect, 
despite the fact that she shares a postmodern epistemology with progressive 
feminists such as Ueno and Yoshimi, one can trace her intellectual genealogy to 
Japanese neo-nationalism. The popularity of For Reconciliation and Comfort 
Women of the Empire in Japanese society can also be seen as resulting from the 
resonance between Park’s perspectives and the trend towards historical revision- 
ism within Japanese society.
In the second section of Comfort Women of the Empire, entitled “Struggle of 
Memory,” Park focuses on the Korean Council as the chief culprit in the erroneous 
“production of public memory” regarding comfort women in Korean society. 
Settling on the term “sexual slavery,” the Korean Council portrays the Japanese 
military as the primary culprit, disseminating this view in Korean society 
through such media as its website’s homepage, the War and Women’s Human 
Rights Museum, the e-Museum of the Victims of Japanese Military Sexual 
Slavery, novels, graphic novels, and films. According to Park, “The narrative of 
comfort women that we [Koreans] have internalized as a ‘pure culture’” overlooks 
the historical truth of pro-Japanese collaboration and preserves a “victim 
structure,” and is the product of the “engagement and arguments of people who 
7. Regarding Japan’s “historical agent controversy” surrounding the liberal view of history, see 
Takahashi (2000). Regarding the related “politics and literature controversy,” see Yi Kyŏng-hŭi 
(2017, 95-114).
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have never had any concern for human rights or peace in Asia” (Park Yu-ha 
2015a, 111, 116-17, 121). Asserting that Korean society venerates only anti-
Japanese, nationalist memories as public memory and excludes other memories, 
Park views the Korean Council as a Korean version of neo-nationalism.
If eighty percent of the 200,000 comfort women were Korean, why did not the 
rest of the comfort women also raise their voices [in 1991 when the first 
testimony emerged]?... It was the Sharing House (Nanum ŭi chip), which was not 
a space preserving memories of love, that made this elderly lady uneasy. In other 
words, this was a space that required the memories of “complete victims.” This is 
also the reason why Japanese comfort women who received compensation have 
not raised their voices. In a place that requires only victims’ memories, con- 
ciliatory memories are excluded. The stories of those who received compensation 
or loved Japanese soldiers cannot be the “stories of comfort women.” (Park Yu-ha 
2015a, 122)
It is precisely this line of argument that has evoked appreciation for Comfort 
Women of the Empire. Those who support the book share in common support 
for the argument reviving the diversity of memories surrounding colonial rule 
and the critical view of patriarchal Korean nationalism that simplifies the image 
of comfort women as “innocent girls of the nation” (Chang Chŏng-il 2015; Kim 
Kyu-hang 2015, 2016, as quoted in Kim Yo-sŏp 2016, 41-45). Actually, prior to 
the revelation of Kim Hak-sun’s testimony in 1991, not only Japan but also the 
Korean government and people were reluctant to raise the issue of comfort 
women as a public concern. As is well known, public surveys on the issue were 
nonexistent. Yang Hyŏn-a points to a male-centric nationalist discourse and 
sensibility as the cause of this “lengthy and deep social silence regarding the 
comfort women issue.” In a social atmosphere in which the comfort women 
issue was represented as an issue of “chastity” and “pride” among male national 
actors, comfort women could not speak of their victimization to their husbands 
or children, and were coerced into shame and silence and marginalized (Yang 
Hyŏn-a 2001, 157-76).
The tendency in Korean society for nationalist discourse to exercise exclusive 
dominance over the comfort women issue has persisted since it was publicized 
in the 1990s. However, Park’s accusation that Korean Council activists have 
selected comfort women survivors’ memories while ignoring those they do not 
want to hear does not accord with the facts. Indeed, Park wrote Comfort Women 
of the Empire based on the collection of testimonies that the Korean Council 
and the Comfort Women Research Institute (Chŏngsindae Yŏn’guso) spent 
much time compiling. And Park is the one who interprets comfort women’s 
“good memories” by arbitrarily separating and extracting them from their 
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context. As Yang Ching-cha (2016, 270-76) points out, an integrated examination 
of comfort women’s testimonies compels one to interpret their psychological 
dependence on Japanese soldiers as reflecting not “comradely relations” but 
“traumatic links with an aggressor,” that is, the pathology of a victim confined 
for extended periods. Furthermore, as Yi Na-yŏng points out, the comfort 
women movement initially began in Korean society as a “challenge to the hostile 
coexistence of nationalism, colonialism, and patriarchy.” Since the 1980s, these 
activists had already “paid attention to the experience of victims concealed by 
national shame” and “candidly exposed the way in which the ‘comfort women’ 
issue was coopted for the (re)constitution of national identity” (Yi Na-Yŏng 
2016, 388-90).
Despite many critical problems, Park’s Comfort Women of the Empire shifted 
the discussion around Japanese military comfort women from ideology and 
nationalism to “experience.” As discussed above, in terms of theory, this shift 
was related to the emergence of postmodern historiography; and in practical 
terms, it was related to the democratization of Korean society. “Memory wars” 
have continued in Korean society since democratization, involving a variety of 
issues such as colonial rule and pro-Japanese collaboration, evaluating military 
dictatorship and industrialization, and the struggle for and reality of democrati- 
zation. Individual memories are formulated and ceaselessly reconstituted within 
a social frame. Thus memory is in some sense always collective and a product of 
the present, not the past. Furthermore, considering that diverse, distinct, and 
multiple memories can exist with respect to a single past, memory is inevitably 
selective, and some memories persist while others are suppressed or discarded. 
Memory that attains a structural quality as a collective identity is accordingly 
always partisan (An Pyŏng-chik 2007, 277-82).
With the development of postmodern historiography, roughly divisible into 
adherents of the linguistic turn and narrative theory, memory is gradually 
superseding history as the criterion by which to understand the past. In other 
words, one may define history as social memory, and it is through memory that 
postmodern historiography criticizes closed, unitary historiography. However, 
as An Pyŏng-chik argues, the relativism of postmodernism and narrative theory 
is not simply intellectual nihilism. Historians adhering to a postmodern 
epistemology must also apply the same standards of criticism and skepticism to 
their own perspectives and analyses. Furthermore, they must focus on the intent 
and purpose of memory rather than its content per se. It is their duty to liberate 
humanity from the “burden of history” by highlighting memory useful for the 
present and future through the “dialectic of memory and creative forgetting” 
(An Pyŏng-chik 2007, 290-303).
98  LEE Hunmi
In this respect, breaking the structure of silence surrounding colonial rule 
and comfort women and reviving various memories requires not the “usurping 
of testimony” evident in works such as Comfort Women of the Empire, but the 
social concern and support for testimony as a cathartic process acknowledging 
the agency and not just the victimhood of comfort women survivors (Yi 
Na-yŏng 2016, 394-97). Comfort women’s experiences and testimonies do not 
serve simply as supplements to documentary evidence; there is a need to 
approach historical reality through these sources in and of themselves. Especially 
now as the generations who experienced the Asia-Pacific War and colonialism 
are rapidly disappearing, scholars must reflect honestly on the methods and 
perspectives of postcolonial historiography of the colonial period, which include 
oral history.8
Kim Mi-yŏng analyzes three modes of representation of comfort women, 
comparing official reports, testimonial records (oral history), and novels. She 
defines oral history as the “revival of omitted history through a verbalization 
process known as ‘representation of memory’” and the primary form of 
historiography that resists the tyranny of official history. Furthermore, sharing 
in the pain of the other produces reflective memory, and when such memory is 
elevated to the status of social collective memory, the edifying power to prevent 
the repetition of unfortunate events emerges. However, the task of recording 
oral testimony is meticulous and difficult, requiring one to understand and read 
contradictions, errors, omissions, frequent silences and sighs, and even spaces 
between words. For example, a woman impregnated through rape that underwent 
forced abortion at the hands of an army surgeon speaks of how she met her first 
love, a Japanese soldier, at a comfort station (Kim Mi-yŏng 2009, 227-32). These 
seemingly contradictory stories each belong to a single comfort woman. 
Nevertheless, treating her testimony as a whole, there appears to be extremely 
little room to interpret her love for the soldier in terms of patriotism, imperial 
citizenship, or voluntary participation in wartime sexual violence.
According to Cho Chŏng-min, postwar Japanese literature’s consideration of 
comfort women has been extremely restricted, and the few works that feature 
comfort women typify them as “romantic objects sharing a human rapport with 
a Japanese soldier or goading Japanese soldiers’ feelings of hatred toward 
women” (Cho Chŏng-min 2016, 268). By comparison, female Okinawan writer 
Sakiyama Tami’s novel It’s not the Moon (Tsuki ya aran) deals with the “repre- 
sentational politics of ‘identity’ operational in literary narratives” and “contention, 
suppression, and struggle over memory related to the representation of comfort 
8. In this regard, see Yi Sŏn-hyŏng (2002).
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women” in quite a sophisticated and literary manner (270).9 The book features 
the following characters: a comfort woman victim who is the first to come 
forward about her experiences yet unable to organize and express them properly; 
a young man who uses her testimony and adds his own narrative to fabricate a 
testimonial record; a young woman editor who desperately tries to read the 
massive, unintelligible manuscript that the comfort woman victim leaves 
behind; and the protagonist who attempts to complete the “autobiography” of the 
comfort woman victim while listening to a recorded tape left behind by the 
editor.
Clearly some historical truths can be revealed reflectively only through 
literature. This comfort woman, who as poor woman from a colony is disadvan- 
taged in three ways, was taken as a sexual slave, underwent repeated gang rape, 
and witnessed the deaths of other comfort women. It is not easy for her to 
convey this experience using the existing language system, and even when she 
does, words do little to adequately communicate her pain. As Kim Mi-Yŏng 
emphasizes: “In terms of how it conveys the infinite gap between what is spoken 
and the pain that goes unexpressed,” the language of literature “is different from 
historical description, which it may complement.” Furthermore, she states that, 
unlike in historical writing, in literature, “The juxtaposition of an other with the 
speaker opens a path to an inner world” (Kim Mi-yŏng 2009, 234-39). In Comfort 
Women of the Empire, Park reconstructs Korean comfort women’s memories 
suppressed by patriarchal nationalism by using Japanese novels that marginalize 
comfort women as sources of historical knowledge. The majority of the speakers 
and protagonists in these books are Japanese men who participated as soldiers 
in the Asia-Pacific War, and the voices of Korean comfort women are lacking. 
Clearly parts of history are missing from the nationalistically unitary repre- 
sentation of comfort women as “girls of the colonies.” In that case, to what 
degree is historical truth represented in Park’s narrative of comfort women as 
“prostitutes of the empire”? It looks as though her intent is to intervene in the 
process by which the comfort women issue is transforming from individual 
trauma into reflective memory, while demanding the development of post-
nationalist memory in Korean society, but encouraging the reactionary forgetting 
that inhibits the formation of reflective memory in Japanese society.
3. An International Politics Approach to the Possibility of Reconciliation
Throughout Comfort Women of the Empire, Park establishes resolution as the 
9. See also Yi Yu-hyŏk (2012) and So Myŏng-sŏn (2014, 2016).
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most pressing priority of the comfort women issue. In this respect, she pays 
attention to the statue of a young girl erected in front of the Japanese Embassy 
in Seoul in December 2011 and the monument to comfort women erected in the 
US in 2013, arguing that they exacerbate tensions between Korea and Japan. 
Furthermore, regarding progressives in both Korea and Japan, on the one hand, 
she blames them for linking the comfort women movement with current 
domestic political problems; and on the other, she blames them for amplifying 
the issue into “‘questioning Japanese historical perceptions in general’ while 
campaigning for global ‘pressure’ on Japan.” She thus thinks progressives have 
made it more difficult to resolve the comfort women issue. Regarding Japanese 
and Korean comfort women activists’ rejection of the 1995 Asian Woman’s 
Fund, which denied Japan’s legal responsibility, Park asserts that the “comfort 
women issue has devolved into a means of changing the actual politics of Japan.” 
Furthermore, emphasizing legal substance over form, she argues that a critical 
Korean Council statement nullified Japanese prime ministers’ apologies, 
additional compensation, and the 2012 plan for a resolution of the comfort 
women issue composed through a visit of the Japanese ambassador with Korean 
comfort women (Park Yu-ha 2015a, 168, 172-73, 197, 211-12).
What is important is not the “movement’s advancement” itself. What is necessary 
is the resolution of the “comfort women issue” and “comfort women’s” resulting 
“liberation from the movement.” The reason why Korea has been unable to 
resolve issues resolved in other countries is that the progressive forces that 
resisted empire have reemerged with the end of the Cold War to resist empire 
once again. (Park Yu-ha 2015a, 257)
Park’s plan for resolution of the comfort women issue in Comfort Women of 
the Empire is a politically engineered consensus situated on the positive 
objective of normalizing Korea-Japan relations and the Japanese state by 
“overcoming” the past. However, might this manner of “resolving the comfort 
women issue by liberating comfort women from the movement” actually resolve 
the comfort women issue? Jeffrey Olick describes three attitudes regarding 
German history that prevailed in Germany from 1945 until the 1990s. First, 
there is Theodore Adorno’s “working through the past” (Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit), which he presented in a 1959 lecture. Adorno criticized the 
fascist trend of the democratic era in West Germany ignoring the burdensome 
Nazi legacy. Rather than reappraisal in a true sense, that is, facing the past with 
the lucid, enlightened spirit advocated by Kant in order to overcome its spell, 
West Germany was interested only in self-protection or preservation. As 
something demanding constant self-criticism, then, Adorno viewed working 
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through the past as superior to a second attitude toward the past, which was 
“mastering the past” (Vergangenheitsbewältung). According to Adorno, 
mastering the past permitted silence about the past. Finally, neoconservatives in 
the late 1970s and 1980s dismissed both working through the past and 
mastering the past as political slogans without differentiating between them, 
advocating instead for normalization of the past.
The West German project to normalize the past expressed itself through two 
strategies: “relativization” and “ritualization.” First, relativization acknowledged 
the violence of the German past but argued that it was no different from that of 
other nations. Second, ritualization pertained to the manner in which major 
national commemorative days normalized or regularized ways of thinking 
about Nazi Germany. West Germany’s attempt to normalize the past in the 
1980s was partly successful. In particular, the relativization strategy was positively 
appraised domestically but caused sensitive problems internationally. With the 
unification of Germany in 1989, overcoming the communist past emerged as a 
new task and the problem of overcoming the Nazi past quickly subsided, which 
served as a means of further normalizing the past. Meanwhile, neoconservative 
rhetoric and relativization continued to intensify throughout the 1980s and 
1990s (Olick 2006, 293-326).
In a speech in spring 2007, Japanese prime minster Abe Shinzō declared that 
comfort women had not been forcibly mobilized. He also stated, “Human rights 
were violated all over the world throughout the twentieth century, and Japan 
was no exception in this regard” (Sankei shinbun, April 27, 2007). These remarks 
can be interpreted as a part of a relativization strategy to normalize the past. As 
criticism mounted, Abe went to the US to apologize, but a number of Japanese 
Diet representatives took out an advertisement in the Washington Post in June 
2007 denying Abe’s apology. Meanwhile, later that year, North American and 
European representatives urged Japan to apologize over the comfort women 
issue. This was the fruit of the Korean Council and other comfort women 
activists’ efforts to draw Amnesty International’s attention and the influential 
power of the emerging testimonies of Korean, Dutch, and Filipino comfort 
women. The European Parliament’s decision to accept Amnesty International’s 
recommendation to view the comfort women issue as one of human trafficking 
was singularly significant.
Just like the German neoconservatives of the 1980s and 1990s, Comfort 
Women of the Empire dismisses working through the past and mastering the 
past as political movements of the progressive left, rather excessively focusing 
on normalization of the past. Particularly through a strategy of relativization, 
Park advances rhetoric claiming that if one criticizes Japan’s imperialist wars and 
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colonial acquisitions, then one must also criticize American imperialism and 
that of other Western great powers; likewise, Japan’s comfort women system was 
problematic, but so were the American military base camp in Tongduch’ŏn and 
the rape of Japanese women in Okinawa following Japan’s wartime defeat. The 
problem is that this kind of relativization strategy extends to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Park claims that a historical “retrial” is possible and 
that “the reason to do so is that retrials produce new values” (Park Yu-ha 2015a, 
163). What kind of values might she be referring to?
Comparing the postwar apology problems of Germany and Japan, Jennifer 
Lind offers the following observations. First, the denial of past crimes or 
unapologetic remembrance hinders reconciliation by heightening the threat 
perceptions of neighboring nations. Representative of this are repeated thoughtless 
statements by high-level Japanese politicians and the 2005 textbook amendment 
largely removing any discussion of the Japanese invasion of Asia. By comparing 
UK-Germany relations and China-Australia-Japan relations, Lind reveals how 
this dynamic is not limited to Korea-Japan relations. Second, this does not mean 
that thorough historical settlements and apologies are necessary for reconcili- 
ation with neighboring countries. Looking at the example of France and 
Germany, a basic apology led to the rapid restoration of relations. And in the 
UK-US-Germany and US-Japan cases, alliances were formed for strategic reasons 
without apologies. Third, the media, NGOs, and scholars are increasingly 
demanding apologies for past human rights violations, but apologies can 
threaten reconciliation by fomenting domestic opposition (Lind 2010, 179-82).
Although Lind’s first conclusion accords with intuitive expectations, her 
second conclusion suggests the counterintuitive possibility of reconciliation 
without apology in international politics. Lind’s third conclusion is relevant for 
Park’s criticism of the Korean Council and the statue of a young girl in front of 
the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. Lind asserts that just the right number of 
apologies—neither too few nor too many—facilitates international reconciliation. 
In other words, policymakers must carefully strike a balance between justice 
and reconciliation while considering the responses of both domestic and inter- 
national audiences. There is also a need for activists to consider any domestic 
backlash that may arise due to pressure to apologize from international society. 
According to Lind, however, the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations owing to 
Japan’s denial of the past and historical distortions is not itself a consequence of 
the cultural particularity of Korea, i.e. excessive nationalism. One can rather 
explain it as an example of a universal phenomenon, in which certain Japanese 
attitudes heighten distrust and threat perception. Furthermore, while it is true 
that an aggressor state’s apology can make reconciliation more difficult by 
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provoking a domestic backlash, this is a constraint that must be considered 
realistically in respect of realizing reconciliation. Just as with Park, designating 
and criticizing civil society activist organizations as barriers to reconciliation 
betrays a preposterous conception of just what reconciliation is for.
One can more clearly grasp the problem with Park’s plan for reconciliation 
with reference to the work of Thomas Berger. Comparing the official historical 
narratives of Germany, Austria, and Japan regarding WWII war crimes, Berger 
describes Germany as the “model penitent,” Austria as the “prodigal penitent,” 
and Japan as the “model impenitent.” He adopts the method of historical realism 
to consider the combined influences of social memory, the calculated interests 
of political elites, and the cultural discourse determining these different official 
historical narratives. According to Lind’s categorization, the historical reconcili- 
ation between Korea and Japan in 1965 amid the Cold War was a kind of 
reconciliation without apology. In terms of Berger’s three elements, this was a 
product of the calculated economic and strategic interests of elites. However, the 
alignment between the two countries was limited, and together with the anti-
regime movement criticizing the pro-Japanese origins of then-President Park 
Chung Hee and other elites, anti-Japanese sentiment continued to function as 
political culture in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, conditions improved for 
Korea-Japan reconciliation, but between 2001 and 2007 Korea, China, and Japan 
became mired in historical disputes owing to domestic political conditions and a 
rightwing backlash in Japan. Due to a lack of neighboring countries urging 
something like the cooperative political framework of the EU or incentives for 
cooperation, progress made in relations in historical disputes in East Asia has 
been weak (Berger 2012, 201-202).
According to Berger, a successful reconciliation strategy must fulfill at least 
five conditions. First, there must exist benefits sufficient to offset the costs of 
reconciliation for political leaders. Second, there must be consistent reciprocity. 
Third, there must be consistency with respect to official narratives across 
various fields. If historical textbooks or politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
are excluded from the diplomatic rhetoric of the apology, as in Japan’s case, its 
sincerity falls into doubt. Fourth, in a democratic society, there must be 
consistency between the behavior of the government and private citizens. In 
other words, reconciliatory efforts must proceed not only from the top down 
but also the bottom up. Fifth, a successful reconciliation strategy requires time 
(Berger 2012, 230-49).
The year 2015 marked seventy years since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. 
Through amendments to the pacifist provisions of its constitution and a 
normalization of its past, Japan is displaying strongly intentions to become a 
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“normal” state. The Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the 
Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion could also be seen as an 
expression of this normalization. However, the sincere reappraisal of the past 
called for by Adorno demands a constant renewal of reflective historical 
consciousness and reform of current politics and society. Furthermore, as Lind 
points out, apologies are not necessarily required for reconciliation, but 
historical narratives rejecting apology for past events escalate threat perceptions 
in neighboring states and impede relations in the long term. Finally, rash 
agreements failing to consider conditions for reconciliation, such as Berger 
describes, do not resolve the issues and only deepen disunity. The task of 
international politics analysis surrounding historical perceptions and the past 
reminds one of the need to consider the domestic politics of memory with 
respect to the international politics of apology. This is because, despite the 
important roles of leadership for deft and cohesive decision-making, and of 
official narratives for inter-state reconciliation, pragmatic agreement at the 
governmental level prioritizing strategic interests cannot rectify individual pain 
and suffering or social memory.
Conclusion
In this article, I have investigated the controversy surrounding Park Yu-ha’s 
Comfort Women of the Empire in terms of the politics of memory. Considering 
how Park denies the Japanese state’s legal responsibility for the comfort women 
system, emphasizes the collaborative (i.e. colonial) particularity of Korean 
comfort women, and understands wartime sexual slavery as prostitution and 
sex work, she demonstrates quite problematic perceptions in Comfort Women of 
the Empire. In this regard, a number of Korean and Japanese scholars have 
criticized this book from the perspectives of international law, history, and 
feminism. Meanwhile, the work has been extremely well regarded within 
Japanese society but prosecuted for defamation within Korean society, suddenly 
revealing the various existential and epistemological conflicts in which it is 
entangled.
Since the 1990s, with the advent of the post-Cold War era and a growing tide 
of democratization, historians all over the world have pursued an alternative, 
resistant, bottom-up historiography. In Korea, this pursuit emerged alongside 
the revelation of Korean comfort women’s testimonies and the inauguration of 
President Kim Yŏng-sam’s civilian government. Divisions between Korea and 
Japan, and within each society, over the comfort women issue has become an 
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issue pertaining to colonial rule, war crimes, and the patriarchal violence and 
mobilization of women suppressed and forgotten under authoritarian govern- 
ments. In the meantime, alongside an epistemological transformation resisting 
traditional discrimination against oral history, testimonial evidence, and 
memory—as opposed to official historical narratives recorded in written 
documents—theoretical consideration of memory has developed in the 
disciplines of history and sociology. By comparison, the fields of political 
science and international politics have not treated the problem of memory in a 
manner commensurate with its importance. In this article, I have focused on 
discussing the case of Comfort Women of the Empire, thus leaving more earnest 
discussion of the politics of memory to future research.
History is constantly reconstructed and projected onto the future through 
present-day choices. In designating history a site of struggle over the representa- 
tion and discourse of memory, one may recognize the great pain and suffering 
of history’s victims. When dealing with a topic such as the comfort women 
issue, in which the pain and suffering is still ongoing, a researcher’s methodo- 
logical ethics become all the more important. On the one hand, through oral 
history, there should be more effort to restore the experiences and voices of 
minorities forgotten by social memory and erased by official historiography. On 
the other, researchers must conduct their research with the strictest caution and 
self-awareness regarding the violence and politics of representation. Finally, 
foreign policy must be planned and implemented with careful consideration of 
the interactions between domestic and international politics. This is something 
to consider with respect to both the progressive project of democratizing 
domestic political society and the conservative project of ensuring the nation’s 
survival.  
• Translated by Keiran MACRAE
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